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Applying the Information Age Combat 
Model: Quantitative Analysis 
of  Network Centric Operations
Sean Deller, Shannon R. Bowling, Ghaith A. Rabadi,               
and Andreas Tolk (Old Dominion University, USA)
Michael I. Bell (Alidade Incorpoated, USA)
Abstract
The nature of  and the approach to command and control is evolving in 
order to meet the challenges of  Information Age warfare. One of  the 
main tasks of  command and control is the arrangement of  the assets 
within a combat force in order to ensure their ability to manage and 
exploit information. Connectivity between the various assets represents 
existence, capacity, reliability, and other attributes of  links establishing 
the connectivity. The Information Age Combat Model was introduced by 
Cares in 2005 to contribute to the development of  an understanding of  
the influence of  connectivity on force effectiveness that can lead eventu-
ally to quantitative prediction and guidelines for design and employment. 
This paper describes the model and several extensions to it. It presents an 
initial attempt to achieve such an understanding through the quantitative 
analysis of  a basic but powerful model of  network centric operations to 
demonstrate the correlation between connectivity and effectiveness. It also 
documents first prototypical studies showing how these results can be used 
in current models and can even contribute to a new generation of  combat 
models that are net-centric instead of  using the current platform-centric 
approach.
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Introduction
“New approaches to accomplishing the functions that are associated 
with Command and Control are becoming an essential part of  an 
Information Age transformation of  military and civilian institutions; 
such a transformation is required to meet twenty-first century security 
challenges.” (Alberts, 2007, 2)
While the nature of  and the approach to command and control is 
evolving in order to meet the challenges of  Information Age war-
fare, the essential functions that must be accomplished remain 
constant. One of  those essential functions is the organization, or 
“arrangement” (from the definition of  “Command and Control” in 
Joint Publication 1-02, 79-80), of  the assets within a combat force. 
Certainly, the many different ways to arrange a given set of  assets 
will have different impacts on the combat effectiveness of  the force. 
Some arrangements will enable self-synchronization, while other 
arrangements will impede it. How then, should an Information Age 
combat force be organized in order to optimize its effectiveness? 
The concept of  Network Centric Operations (NCO) represents a 
shift from traditional attrition-based approaches to a warfighting 
style that emphasizes speed of  command and self-synchronization. 
One goal of  NCO is to field a force that is capable of  achieving 
information superiority, i.e. “having a dramatically better awareness 
or understanding of  the battlespace rather than simply more raw 
data” (Cebrowski and Garstka 1998, 32), thus enabling a massing of  
effects instead of  the traditional massing of  forces that will disrupt 
the enemy’s strategy and preclude his courses of  action. Prior to the 
introduction of  the NCO concept, assessment of  the combat poten-
tial of  a force tended to focus on force composition (the number 
of  platforms or other entities of  each type) and individual platform 
capabilities, with force lay-down (spatial distribution) and employ-
ment (tactics) as important but scenario-dependent factors. Network 
centric operations shift the focus towards the information-based 
aspects of  force employment: information collection, communica-
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tion, and exploitation. Central to the ability of  a force to manage 
and exploit information is its connectivity: the existence, capacity, 
reliability, and other attributes of  the links that connect its platforms, 
command and control centers, and other entities. A fundamental 
problem is to develop an understanding of  the influence of  connec-
tivity on force effectiveness that can lead eventually to quantitative 
prediction and guidelines for design and employment.
This paper presents an initial attempt to achieve such an under-
standing through the quantitative analysis of  a basic but powerful 
model of  network centric operations and demonstrate the correla-
tion between connectivity and effectiveness. Furthermore, it shows 
possible ways to apply implications and results of  such simple mod-
els to new modeling and simulation approaches in support of  legacy 
models of  operations with military participation and introduces pro-
totypical implementations for a potential new generation of  combat 
models.
The Information Age Combat Model (IACM)
The Information Age Combat Model (IACM), recently introduced 
by Cares (2005), attempts to describe combat (or competition) 
between distributed, networked forces or organizations. The basic 
objects of  this model are not platforms or other entities capable of  
independent action, but rather nodes that can perform elementary 
tasks (sense, decide, or influence) and links that connect these nodes. 
Information flow between the nodes is generally necessary for any 
useful activity to occur. This focus on “network-centric” rather than 
“platform-centric” operations is intended to advance the state of  the 
art in combat modeling “by explicitly representing interdependen-
cies, properly representing complex local behaviors and capturing 
the skewed distribution of  networked performance” (Cares 2005, 
34).
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The IACM employs four types of  nodes defined by the following 
properties:
• Sensors receive signals about observable phenomena from other 
nodes and send them to Deciders;
• Deciders receive information from Sensors and make decisions 
about the present and future arrangements of  other nodes;
• Influencers receive directions from Deciders and interact with 
other nodes to affect the state of  those nodes;
• Targets are nodes that have military value but are not Sensors, 
Deciders, or Influencers.
These properties represent the minimum required for each type of  
node. Other possible characteristics will emerge in the following dis-
cussion. Each node belongs to a “side” in the competition, of  which 
there are at least two. We will restrict the present discussion to two 
sides, conventionally termed BLUE and RED. In principle, any pair 
of  nodes can interact, regardless of  side, but some restrictions will be 
found to occur for both theoretical and practical reasons. It is worth 
noting that Influencers can act on any type of  node, and Sensors 
can detect any type. The Target type was introduced primarily to 
reflect the fact that not all military assets fall into one of  the other 
three types. In most situations, however, an Influencer will target an 
adversary Sensor, Decider, or Influencer.
The basic combat network shown in figure 1 represents the simplest 
situation in which one side can influence another. The BLUE Sensor 
(S) detects the RED Target (T) and informs the BLUE Decider (D) 
of  the contact. The Decider then instructs the BLUE influencer (I) 
to engage the Target. The Influencer initiates effects, such as exert-
ing physical force, psychological or social influence, or other forms 
of  influence on the target. The process may be repeated until the 
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Decider determines that the desired effect has been achieved. It 
should be noted that the effect assessment requires sensing, which 






The basic combat network represents the simplest situa-
tion in which one side can influence another.
Each of  the four links in figure 1 is shown with a different type 
of  line in order to emphasize the fact that the flows across these 
links may be very different. In particular, some links may represent 
purely physical interactions, while others may entail both physical 
processes and information flows. The figures in this paper utilize the 
basic elements of  graph theory.  For more details on graph theory 
the interested reader is referred to Chartrand (1984). 
Cares (2005) described the simplest complete (two-sided) combat 
network as having 36 possible links. While the number of  possible 
links for eight nodes (four each for BLUE and RED) is 64, we were 
able to exclude 28 and reduce that number to 36 based on the fol-
lowing important assumptions: 
• Targets are passive; their only role is to be sensed and influ-
enced. Therefore, 12 links from Targets to any nodes other than 
a Sensor were excluded.
cf .... --, n·· '0 
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• Sensors take no action; they provide information to Deciders 
and Sensors. Therefore, 10 links from Sensors to any nodes other 
than a Sensor or own Decider were excluded.
• Deciders act only through Influencers but can be sensed. There-
fore, 6 links from Deciders to any adversary nodes except a Sen-
sor were excluded.
The resulting BLUE (depected in black) and RED (depicted in gray) 









The simplest complete combat network represents all the 
ways in which Sensors, Deciders, Influencers and Targets interact 
meaningfully with each other.
When the BLUE/RED symmetry is taken into account, the number 
of  link types is reduced to 18. These are listed in table 1, where the 
nodes are identified as in figure 2. Links between a node and itself  in 
figure 2 have been interpreted as connecting two different nodes of  
the same type and side. 
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SBLUE SBLUE IBLUE DBLUE
SRED SRED IRED DRED
SBLUE DBLUE IBLUE IBLUE
SRED DRED IRED IRED
SBLUE SRED IBLUE TBLUE
SRED SBLUE IRED TRED
DBLUE SBLUE IBLUE SRED
DRED SRED IRED SBLUE
DBLUE DBLUE IBLUE DRED
DRED DRED IRED DBLUE
DBLUE IBLUE IBLUE IRED
DRED IRED IRED IBLUE
DBLUE TBLUE IBLUE TRED
DRED TRED IRED TBLUE
DBLUE SRED TBLUE SBLUE
DRED SBLUE TRED SRED
IBLUE SBLUE TBLUE SRED
IRED SRED TRED SBLUE
9
I attacking own S, or S 
detecting own I
18 S detecting adversary T
8 S detecting adversary D 17 S detecting own T
7 D commanding own T 16 I attacking adversary T
6 D commanding own I 15 I attacking adversary I
5 D commanding own D 14 I attacking adversary D
4
S detecting own D, or D 
commanding own S
13
I attacking adversary S, or S 
detecting adversary I
3 S detecting adversary S 12 I attacking own T
2 S reporting to own D 11
I attacking own I, or I 
coordinating with own I
S detecting own S, or S 
coordinating with own S
1 10
I attacking own D, or I 
reporting to own D
The interpretation of  some of  the links (types 1, 4, 9, 10, 11, and 
13 in table 1) is ambiguous. This was recognized in the initial devel-
opment of  the IACM (Cares 2005), and resolving this issue was 
described as both “the next major advance” in the development 
of  the model and a requirement for “practical” (i.e., quantitative) 
analysis based on it. The simulations presented here are a step in 
this direction, since they employ only basic combat networks similar 
to figure 1, but with the Target replaced by an adversary Sensor or 
Influencer. These “combat cycles” (Cares 2005) contain only links of  
types 2, 3, 6, 13, and 15. Of  these, only type 13 is ambiguous. Both 
interpretations of  this link will be used, but the context of  the model 
always makes clear which is intended.
Once the IACM has been defined in terms of  a network of  nodes 
and links, the language and tools of  graph theory (see, for example, 
Chartrand 1984) can be used for both description and analysis. A 
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concise description of  any graph is provided by the adjacency matrix 
A, in which the row and column indices represent the nodes, and the 
matrix elements are either one or zero according to the rule: Aij = 
1, if  there exists a link from node i to node j and Aij = 0, otherwise. 
Many properties of  a graph or network can be calculated directly 
from the adjacency matrix, and two are of  particular interest here. 
Since combat power or influence can be exerted only when there 
exists a connected cycle that includes the node to be influenced, the 
detection of  cycles in the graph is of  great importance. One method 
used in studying the evolution of  complex adaptive systems (chemi-
cal, biological, social, and economic) is calculation of  the principal 
(maximum) eigenvalue of  the adjacency matrix (Jain and Krishna, 
1998). The existence of  a real, positive principal eigenvalue of  Aij is 
guaranteed by the Perron-Frobenius theorem, and this eigenvalue 
λPFE (and the corresponding eigenvector) are often referred to as the 
Perron-Frobenius Eigenvalue (eigenvector). It is readily shown (Jain 
and Krishna, 1999) that for a graph with no closed cycles λPFE = 0. 
For a graph with a single cycle of  any length, one obtains λPFE = 1. 
Graphs with more complicated cycle structures have λPFE > 1. This 
had led to the proposal (Cares 2005) that λPFE be adopted as a mea-
sure of  the ability of  a network to produce feedback effects in gen-
eral and combat power specifically in the case of  the IACM. This is 
essentially the hypothesis explored in the present work.
An alternative, but closely related approach is based on the fact that 
An (the nth power of  the adjacency matrix) can be used to obtain the 
number of  distinct paths connecting any pair of  nodes (Chartrand 
1984). Specifically, (An)ij , which is the ij matrix element of  A
n, is equal 
to the number of  distinct paths of  length n connecting nodes i and j. 
In particular, (An)ii i s the number of  distinct closed paths from node 
i back to itself. If  node i is an adversary Target T, then (An)TT is the 
number of  distinct combat cycles of  length n that include T. This 
represents the number of  different ways that T can be engaged by 
the opposing force. In general, combat cycles must be of  length at 
least four, and if  the links are restricted to the types shown in figure 1, 
they must be of  length exactly four. In this case, the matrix element 
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(A4)TT is equal to the number of  combat cycles that pass through 
the Target T and is therefore a potential measure of  the combat 
power that can be brought to bear on it. Under special conditions 
that will be described below, it is possible to establish a quantitative 
connection between λPFE and (A
4)TT, le nding further support to the 
hypothesis that λPFE can be used as a measure of  effectiveness for a 
distributed, networked force or organization.
A Basic Agent-Based Model Using the IACM
The structure of  the IACM makes it clear that the λPFE is a quantifi-
able metric with which to measure the organization of  a networked 
force, but is it an indicator of  combat effectiveness?  To determine 
this we constructed an agent-based model representation of  the 
IACM and conducted a series of  force-on-force engagements using 
opposing forces of  equal assets and capabilities, but differing in their 
connectivity arrangements or configurations. These differences in 
connectivity often, but not necessarily, lead to unequal λPFE values. 
The agent-based paradigm was utilized for this purpose because the 
resulting models provide the ability to account for small unit organi-
zation, maneuver, and the networked effects that are the focus of  our 
investigation. An additional advantage of  utilizing an agent-based 
model was the ability to work around the ambiguities of  link inter-
pretation in the IACM. For example, instead of  a mutually exclusive 
choice between defining a directional link from a BLUE Influencer 
to a RED Sensor (type 13 in table 1) as either the Influencer “tar-
geting” the Sensor or as the Sensor “sensing” the Influencer, both 
abilities can be represented in the agent-based model. The agent-
based modeling environment utilized for this research was NetLogo 
(Wilenski 1999).
The first challenge in modeling the IACM concerned the adjacency 
matrix representation of  the network. The IACM as originally 
described by Cares (2005) uses a single adjacency matrix to reflect 
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the collective organization of  both BLUE and RED forces. In this 
approach, the λPFE value is dependent on the configurations of  both 
the BLUE and RED forces and might well represent the extent to 
which feedback effects occur in the engagement. Obviously, BLUE 
and RED each seek separately to maximize their own networked 
effects while minimizing those of  the opposing force. This cannot 
be represented by a single λPFE value, so we calculate separate val-
ues (λBLUE and λRED) to reflect the potential networked effects of  the 
configurations of  each of  the opposing forces. These calculations 
required the adjacency matrices include a single Target node rep-
resentative of  all the enemy forces capable of  being targeted. In 
other words, the values of  λBLUE and λRED are determined solely by 
the arrangement of  their respective assets, independent of  the asset 
arrangement of  the opposing force.
The code of  the agent-based model closely follows the logic of  
the IACM, with a few notable exceptions. Agents served as Sen-
sors, Deciders, and Influencers, but Targets were not included as 
they served no purpose other than to absorb losses. Given that this 
work represents a “first cut” effort, including Target agents with no 
detect, direct, or influence capabilities would only serve to clutter 
the results. Additionally, Deciders cannot be destroyed in the present 
model. This was done in recognition of  their unique role in connect-
ing multiple Sensors and Influencers. Destruction of  a Decider typi-
cally renders a number of  other nodes useless (effectively destroyed), 
making it a particularly high value target. Since targets are detected 
and engaged in random order in our model, we wished to give all 
targets equal value in order not to generate atypical engagements 
that might bias the results.  
The agent rules sets, themselves, function in accordance with the 
IACM. Sensors detect enemy nodes within the sensing range param-
eter, and communicate that information to their assigned (con-
nected) Deciders. Deciders communicate the sensing information 
to their assigned Influencers. Influencers destroy the nearest enemy 
node that is both “sensed” by a Sensor connected to that Influenc-
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er’s Decider, and within the influencing range parameter. Deciders 
direct Sensor movement towards areas of  suspected enemy nodes. 
Deciders direct Influencers to move towards the nearest “sensed” 
enemy node. All nodes are assumed to perform their functions per-
fectly and instantaneously. Errors and delays representing techno-
logical and human performance factors will be addressed in follow-
on work. First efforts are addressed in a later section of  this article. 
Most importantly, the rule sets and parameter values for both BLUE 
and RED agents were identical. 
Structure of  the Experiment
In order to best associate any difference in force effectiveness to the 
difference in connectivity, the opposing forces consisted of  the same 
number of  Sensors, Deciders, and Influencers, differing only in the 
manner in which they were arranged (i.e., linked). To preclude any 
bias between Sensors and Influencers, both forces contained equal 
numbers of  them with equal capabilities (i.e., the sensing range was 
chosen equal to the influencing range, and the speeds of  movement 
of  the two types of  node were equal). Consequently, the composition 
of  both forces followed an X-Y-X-1 (Sensor-Decider-Influencer-
Target) template. 
For any particular values of  X and Y, there is a finite number of  
ways to arrange those assets. In order to gain a “first order” under-
standing of  the IACM, we made two key scoping decisions. First, 
each Sensor and Influencer would only be connected to one Decider 
(but any given Decider could be connected to multiple Sensors and 
Influencers). Second, the connectivity within any X-Y-X-1 force 
was limited to only those “vertical” links necessary to create com-
bat cycles (i.e., link types 2, 3, 6, 13, and 15), which are the essence 
of  the λPFE (the most basic element of  the IACM). As noted below, 
future work will include “horizontal” links between Sensors, Decid-
ers, and Influencers, such as link types 1, 5, and others. This can 
significantly enhance both the λPFE value and the performance of  
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any given network configuration, but it requires the introduction of  
additional rules to manage and exploit the information carried by 
these links. The present model provides a baseline for assessing the 
effect of  adding additional types of  links. In addition the simplifi-
cation used here is sufficient to insure that (λPFE)
4 is equal to (A4)TT, 
providing the exact, quantitative relationship mentioned previously 
between λPFE and the number of  combat cycles. 
While the X-Y-X-1 template significantly scoped the focus of  this 
effort, the number of  possible configurations for a given force still 
becomes large very quickly. For example, there are a total of  nine 
possible ways to dist ribute four Sensors and four Influencers across 
three Deciders (see figure 3). No matter how you distribute them, 
one Decider will have two Sensors linked to it, and one Decider 
(which may or may not be the same Decider) will have two Influ-
encers assigned to it. Fortunately, since the nodes of  the IACM are 
generic it is possible to reduce this set by eliminating those configu-
rations that are, in effect, identical. The only meaningful difference 
between the nine possible configurations of  a 4-3-4-1 networked 
force is whether the Decider that is linked to two Sensors is the 
same Decider that is linked to two Influencers. All other possible 
configurations are duplicative of  the first two (and are shaded gray). 
Adding a single Sensor and Influencer yields a 5-3-5-1 networked 
force, which can be organized in 36 different ways. By applying this 
same logic, we reduce those 36 possible configurations to only eight 
meaningfully different configurations. Even with these most basic of  
examples, the difference between the number of  possible configura-
tions and number of  meaningfully different combinations becomes 
quite apparent.






























































































































































1 2 1 1 2 1 1
2 2 1 1 1 2 1
3 2 1 1 1 1 2
4 1 2 1 2 1 1
5 1 2 1 1 2 1
6 1 2 1 1 1 2
7 1 1 2 2 1 1
8 1 1 2 1 2 1
9 1 1 2 1 1 2
There are nine possible configurations of  a 4-3-4-1 net-
worked force, but only two (unshaded) are meaningfully different.
Identifying the meaningful configurations is crucial for the pur-
pose of  scoping the problem. While a 7-3-7-1 networked has 225 
possible configurations, applying this same logic reduces this to a 
much more manageable number of  only 42 meaningfully different 
configurations. Testing each of  the 225 possible configurations of  a 
7-3-7-1 networked force against all 225 possible configurations of  
an opposing 7-3-7-1 networked force would require 50,625 unique 
engagements, but 42 combinations would only require 1,764 unique 
engagements. Since the number of  meaningful combinations for 
any given set of  nodes is a function of  the number of  unique values 
of  the allocation combinations of  X across Y, we attempted to define 
the function in order to automatically generate the combinations. 
This was not a simple task. Although the allocation resembles a par-
tition problem, the exact numerical sequence of  the numbers of  
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meaningful combinations was difficult to establish. Since determin-
ing what this function might be is not the purpose of  this research, 
we calculated the numbers of  meaningful combinations for all X-Y-
X-1 forces where X < 10 and Y < 7 using a simple algorithm based 
on the numbers of  unique values for the distributions of  Sensors and 
Influencers across the Deciders. The resulting totals are summarized 
in figure 4:
Figure 4. 
3 4 5 6 7
3 1
4 2 1
5 8 2 1
6 19 9 2 1
7 42 27 9 2 1
8 78 74 30 9 2
9 139 168 95 31 9
10 224 363 248 105 31














   












The numbers of  meaningful combinations of  all X-Y-X-1 
networked forces where X < 10 and Y < 7.
Identical configurations always have the same λPFE value; however, 
it is possible for meaningfully different configurations to share the 
same λPFE value. The adjacency matrices for all meaningful configu-
rations will only differ in two sections (see the unshaded sections of  
an example adjacency matrix in figure 5), regardless of  the total 
numbers of  Sensors, Deciders, or Influencers. These unshaded sec-
tions reflect the connectivity of  each Sensor and Influencer to a par-
ticular Decider, and vary by configuration based on the allocation 
of  Sensors and Influencers across the Deciders. The shaded areas 
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represent the absolute absence of  any links between those types of  
nodes (such as the “horizontal” links discussed earlier), or the abso-
lute existence of  links between those types of  nodes (such as the 
links from all BLUE influencers to the RED Target). Since four-
teen of  sixteen sections of  the adjacency matrices for each of  the 42 
configurations are identical, the variance between the λPFE values is 
greatly reduced.  
Figure 5. 
To
S S S S S S S D D D I I I I I I I T
S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
T 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fr
om
An adjacency matrix for one of  the 42 meaningfully differ-
ent configurations of  a 7-3-7-1 networked force.
In the case of  a 7-3-7-1 networked force, the 42 meaningfully differ-
ent configurations had 30 unique λPFE values ranging from 1.821 to 
2.280. The full range of  mathematical values for a λPFE of  an adja-
cency matrix containing 18 nodes is from 0 (for a network with no 
links at all) to 18 (for a maximally connected network).  Note that the 
range of  λPFE values for the 42 meaningful combinations of  a 7-3-7-1 
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force is only a small segment of  this full range due to the few differ-
ences between the links within any two of  those configurations. The 
cause of  this constrained range, however, is significant and becomes 
apparent when applying the statistical measures from various studies 
of  network systems compiled by Cares (2005).  
Of  all the network statistics referenced in those studies, the λPFE was 
the only one that varied in value between the 42 meaningful config-
urations; all others remained constant. Each configuration consists 
of  the same numbers of  nodes (18) and links (28). Each configura-
tion shares a similar skewed degree distribution and, consequently, 
since each path within these configurations is the shortest path, the 
betweeness value for each configuration must also be skewed. Each 
configuration lacks any direct connectivity between its largest hubs, 
such as between Deciders or from any Decider directly to the Target 
node. Likewise, the characteristic path length, clustering coefficient, 
path horizon, neutrality rating, and susceptibility of  each of  these 
configurations is identical. Given that the λPFE is the only one of  
these metrics that varies between these configurations, it is the only 
one of  these metrics that might measure any potential variation in 
the effectiveness of  these 42 configurations. 
Since the focus of  this effort is to gain insight into the relationship 
between the λPFE value and the effectiveness of  a networked force, 
the agent-based model rules of  engagement were quite simple. 
Engagements continued until either all of  the Sensors and Influenc-
ers of  one force were annihilated, or both forces were incapable of  
continued combat (i.e., neither side contained a functioning combat 
cycle). A single run of  the agent-based model will result in a BLUE 
win, a RED win, or an undecided result. 
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Initial Results
A trial experiment was conducted to investigate whether this 
approach is feasible, and the results are promising. Various force-on-
force engagements were modeled utilizing the 42 meaningfully differ-
ent configurations of  a 7-3-7-1 networked force for both BLUE and 
RED. Since each of  these configurations contains the same numbers 
of  Sensors, Deciders, and Influencers, differing only in their con-
nectivity, it is most likely that any difference in performance would 
be a consequence of  this connectivity difference. A comprehensive 
test of  each of  these 42 configurations against each other required 
1,764 different engagements. Each engagement was represented by 
30 replications, each with a random distribution of  the BLUE and 
RED nodes across the battlespace. A graphical representation of  the 





BLUE PFE RED PFE
p(BLUE Win)
The probability of  a BLUE Win for each of  the 42 BLUE 
configurations (with λBLUE values varying from 1.821 to 2.280) against 
each of  the 42 RED configurations (also with λRED values varying 
from 1.821 to 2.280).  Surface values > 0.5 are shaded blue and sur-
face values < 0.5 are shaded red.
These initial results indicate that as the BLUE force is organized to 
enhance its networked effects (i.e., the λPFE value increases) its effec-
tiveness generally increases. While the resulting surface is far from 
smooth a general trend does appear: the smaller the λPFE value, the 
smaller the probability of  a win. The outlying configurations may be 
due to the increased vulnerability of  those configurations but con-
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tinued investigation is necessary. This trend becomes more apparent 
in figure 7 where the probability of  a BLUE win is averaged over all 
RED configurations. Note that many BLUE configurations had an 
identical λPFE value (there were 13 unique λPFE values for the 42 con-
figurations). Clearly, it appears that the probability of  a BLUE win 
increases for those BLUE configurations with a greater λPFE value. A 
simple linear regression confirms this with a coefficient of  determi-

















The average probability of  a BLUE win for each of  the 42 
meaningfully different configurations of  a 7-3-7-1 BLUE force.
These initial results are tentative. They are the result of  a series of  
experiments conducted in support of  an ongoing PhD thesis at Old 
Dominion University. Future work within this research must evalu-
ate if  this trend holds for other configurations as well, and then show 
how to generalize these insights.
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Related and Future Work
So far, agent-based models were used in support of  finding closed 
mathematical solutions. The insights gained from such efforts should 
not be underestimated. However, the assumptions may simplify the 
underlying problem too much for application in other domains of  
simulation systems, in particular training and support to opera-
tions (Sokolowski and Banks 2008). Therefore, ongoing work is in 
progress at the Virginia Modeling Analysis and Simulation Center 
(Bowen 2008, Tolk 2008) and at Alidade Incorporated (Bell 2008) to 
eliminate several of  the simplifying assumptions used in the present 
work and to extend the IACM.
In the present work, the rules governing the actions of  each node 
and the strategy for communication between nodes were executed 
with complete certainty. Many military applications, however, must 
work with probabilities instead. In addition to probabilities associ-
ated with the nodes (for example, probability of  detection or proba-
bility of  kill), communication probabilities must be introduced. This 
results in a re-interpretation of  the adjacency matrix A. The row and 
column indices still represent the nodes, and the matrix elements 
represent the links. Where no link exists, the matrix element is zero. 
Where a link exists, the matrix element can adopt a value between 
zero and one, that is, Aij = x (with 0 < x  ≤ 1), where x represents t he 
likelihood that the intended use of  this link is accomplished. The 
probability distribution of  Aij can be specified by the model devel-
oper, and the expected value x can be used in connection with many 
well-known methods for network analysis. When the link represents 
assured communication, x becomes equal to one, and the adjacency 
matrix assumes the form used in the present work.
In an effort to make the IACM more useful to traditional combat 
model developers for applications in the domains of training and 
operational support, Tolk et al. (2008) have proposed the addition 
of a new type of node, the Communication node. This node can be 
used in a number of ways. It can represent a communication prob-
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ability less than one, rather than assigning this function to a link. It 
can provide bidirectional communication, as when a Decider both 
receives reports from a Sensor and tasks the Sensor to (for example) 
change position or area of observation. It can also extend the range 
of communication between the other nodes or provide communi-
cation around obstacles. In military operations communications is 
the foundation of orchestrated campaigns. Insuring communications 
by distributing and protecting the means (communication nodes) as 
well as denying the opponent the gained situational awareness by 
destroying or jamming his communication nodes can contribute 
decisively to the success or failure of a campaign.
Figure 8 shows the resulting enhanced IACM as implemented in 
a prototype (Bowen 2008). In this prototype, the interpretation for 
links between Influencers and Targets are hit and kill probabilities 
– P(Hit) x P(Kill) –, sensing probabilities for links between Targets 
and Sensors – P(Sense) –, and probabilities for successful commu-
nications between nodes – P(Commo). Furthermore, every node is 











The enhanced IACM includes communication nodes and 
uses probability values in the adjacency matrix.
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This enhanced IACM eliminates some of  the restrictions on link type 
imposed in the present work. Additional restrictions are removed in 
models under development (Bell 2008) that provide for coordination 
among multiple Deciders, sharing of  control of  an Influencer by 
several Deciders, and sharing of  Sensor reports among Deciders. 
These models focus on the planning process: the principal role of  
the Deciders is to develop and distribute sensing and engagement 
plans to be executed by the Sensors and Influencers. Since the addi-
tional links available in these models can be used to develop added 
combat power, it is expected that, as in the present work, greater val-
ues of  λPFE will be associated with increases in combat effectiveness.
An ambitious prototypical application of  the IACM (Bowen 2008) 
integrates it into a larger framework for agent-based combat simula-
tion.  As the model described before, this version is also implemented 
in Netlogo (Wilenski 1999). In this first prototype that may evolve 
into a new generation of  combat models, everything is modeled as 
an agent: environmental objects (trees, buildings, roads, etc.), com-
bat systems (Influencers, Sensors, Deciders), and the effects (com-
munication, attrition, and sensing). Each entity represents one or 
more roles as defined in the IACM. The agent executions result in 
a bipartite directed graph that connects entity agents (environment 
objects and combat systems) via effect agents as shown in figure 9. 
In this interpretation of  the model, an Influencer creates an effect 
agent with the desired effect.

















A bipartite directed graph of  an example combat cycle in 
the enhanced IACM.
While in traditional models this effect is directed against an intended 
Target, in this model it is the effect agent that identifies which Tar-
get or Targets with which it is going to connect. This allows model-
ing of  all effects that influence combat significantly, including those 
that are normally unintentional such as fratricide or self-jamming 
of  communications. It also allows the cascading of  effects and other 
effect-based models as envisioned by Smith (2002). The initial results 
obtained from a demonstration model are very promising, exhibit-
ing the ability to represent network centric operations and demon-
strating the employment of  effect agents to allow a more realistic 
agent interaction with the environment and to extend the effect of  
an inte raction beyond the two primary parties involved. 
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Summary & Conclusion
Meeting the security challenges of  the twenty-first century will 
require innovative approaches to implementing the functions of  
command and control in the Information Age. Selecting the right 
approach requires an understanding of  the potential networked 
effects of  a combat force resulting from quantifiable metrics that 
properly represent the interdependencies and complex local behav-
iors of  Information Age warfare. 
This paper presented an initial attempt to achieve such understand-
ing through the use of  the Perron-Frobenius Eigenvalue (λPFE) as a 
measure of  the ability of  a network to produce feedback effects in 
general and combat power specifically in the case of  the IACM. The 
results of  the agent-based modeling presented in this paper indicate 
that the value of  the λPFE is a significant measurement of  the per-
formance of  an Information Age combat force. Consequently, the 
IACM can provide useful insights to inform the difficult decisions 
and trade-offs during the ongoing transformation into an Informa-
tion Age combat force. The ideas presented here can be applied 
to the development of  a new generation of  combat simulations to 
support war fighting at the operational and tactical levels. While no 
practical systems have yet been implemented, the success of  initial 
prototypes provides reason to believe that it will be possible to over-
come the obstacles that often block the use of  simulation tools to 
support analysis, planning, and execution of  current operations.  
The IACM can be generalized beyond attrition applications. Since 
the IACM is focused on network capability, the abstract represen-
tation of  the acts of  sensing (information), deciding, and influenc-
ing (whether it be combat or some other action taken) enable it to 
model almost any activity involving planning and decision making. 
The nodes represent capabilities and the connections the accessibil-
ity (and, if  the enhanced IACM is applied, the probability to have 
access to the capability). Each mission consists of  certain required 
capabilities and their connectivity can therefore be represented as 
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a network. The likelihood of  success for a mission can be directly 
mapped to the connectivity of  its required capabilities. That con-
nectivity can be informed by the quantitative metric (λPFE value) 
addressed in this work. As such, this paper is not limited to merely 
addressing net-centric attrition but can be applied to all kinds of  net-
centric operations as described in the NATO Code of  Best Practice 
for C2 Assessment (2002), among others.
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